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We present evidence that the loan problems of Japanese banks are related to the introduction of
the 1992 BIS capital regulations. The cross-sectional correlation between the major twenty-one banks’
prior-to-1992 BIS capital deficiencies and their risky lending is around 50%. The risky lending generated
higher short-term retained earnings and thus increases in capital. More capital-deficient banks also used
the external capital market less, indicating greater asymmetry-of-information problems for the weaker
banks. Regional II banks that were not affected by the BIS regulations did not increase their risky lending,
while their brethren with overseas operations did. Finally, we find no evidence in excess returns on
Japanese banks’ stocks that the BIS regulations ex an e benefited them.
* We are grateful to Reuven Glick, Akiyoshi Horiuchi, Takao Kobayashi, Tomoko Kusamoto, Yukiko
Ohara, Jeff Rogers, Nobukazu Saeki, Yasuhiko Tanigawa, and Masashi Toshino  for helpful comments
and data. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on Emerging Trends in Japanese
Financial Markets at Columbia University, December 8, 1995, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
on August 6, 1996, and the Symposium on Deregulation, Finance, and Monetary Policy Issues in Japan
at U.C. Santa Cruz, October 14, 1996, and we also thank the participants for their comments. Part of this
paper was written while the second author was a visiting scholar at the Department of Economics,
University of Tokyo.
21. Introduction
The 1990s bad loan problems of Japanese banks and their consequences continue to receive
extensive press coverage.  In the last year or so, it has become reasonably well-agreed that these problem
loans amount to some 100 trillion yen, or roughly 15% of outstanding loans.  However, there is still little
systematic analysis of the underlying cause of the problems.  We look at the evidence here, and find that
the BIS capital regulations,1 which have covered banks’ credit risk since 1992 and will be extended to
cover market risk in 1997, were a major factor. Our evidence is that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
impending BIS regulations had the perverse effect of giving banks an incentive to increase the risk of their
loan portfolios; that the mandated loan loss provisioning and bad debt write-off procedures abetted rather
than restrained the risk-taking incentive; that the incentive was compounded by the decline in profitability
of banks’ traditional business; and that the early-1980s deregulation in bank lending, i.e. relaxation of
“window guidance,” made it possible for banks to act on their incentives.
Our empirical evidence covers two sets of Japanese banks. One consists of all city, trust, and
long-term banks for which failure to meet the BIS requirements was not a viable option. We find that,
among these banks, those with the bigger capital deficiencies vis-à-vis the impending eight percent risk-
weighted capital requirement had higher subsequent growth rates in risky lending in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. For example, in March 1989, the first fiscal year in which BIS ratios were reported and a
point in time at which passage of the regulations seemed reasonably certain, the rank correlation between
banks’ capital deficiencies and their subsequent increase in risky real-estate-related-lending was 49%.
Next,  the 1990 stock market crash deplenished banks’ hidden reserves, 45% of which count as Tier II
capital. The cross-sectional rank correlation between the declines in banks’ hidden reserves from March
                                                 
1 The standards were actually established by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervisio  which was
established at the end of 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten industrialized countries.
The Committee holds its meetings at the BIS headquarters in Basle, Switzerland, which perhaps is why
the capital standards are conventionally referred to as “BIS capital standards.” This said, we follow the
conventional terminology in this paper.
31989 to March 1991 (the stock market had fallen about 32% from its peak by March 1991) and their
subsequent increase in r al-estate related lending was about 54%.
A second set of Japanese banks, the Regional II banks, enables us to do a “controlled” experiment
of the proposition that BIS capital regulations were a major stimulus to risky lending. Capital deficiencies
were positively correlated with risky lending for the regional banks which appeared to have some overseas
operations and which reported BIS capital ratios, but the correlation was weaker than for the main banks.
However, for the regional banks which did not have overseas operations and were not affected by the BIS
capital guidelines, essentially no relationship existed between their synthetic BIS capital ratios or
estimated capital deficiencies and risky lending.
The hypothesis which these results support is that Japanese banks responded to the tighter BIS
capital regulations by increasing the risk of their loan portfolios. BIS capital consists in large part of
shareholders equity plus retained earnings and general reserves. Faced with declining margins and the
approaching BIS capital requirements, banks could make ex ante ris ier loans with higher promised rates
of return and improve retained earnings and thus their capital positions so long as the higher expected
defaults on riskier loans were not charged “up-front” against the loans. In fact, tax-deductible general
reserves in Japan were a fixed 0.3% of domestic and OECD loan capital. Moreover, the legal and
administrative rules that Japanese banks had to satisfy for tax deductibility of write-offs and specific
provisions were stringent, so neither kept up with increased defaults as they began to be realized. At the
same time, the BIS risk categories for assets are extremely broad --- all commercial loans have the same
100% weighting --- so the riskier loans weren’t penalized with higher risk weights in computing risk-
weghted assets, the denominator of the capital ratio.
Banks could also meet the capital guidelines by raising external equity. However, we find
evidence of a “pecking order” among sources of capital. Over the 1987-1992 period leading up to the end-
of-fiscal-year-1992 implementation date for the guidelines, the banks making the riskier, higher-yi lding,
loans which on average generated higher short-run retained earnings resorted less to the external market
for capital. The p cking-order for raising capital is consistent with the potential asymmetries in
4information about banks’ bad loans and hidden reserves during this time, and the asymmetry appears to
have been more severe for the weaker banks.
On average, Japanese banks elected to increase loan risk in order to satisfy the accounting-based
BIS capital standards. In the short-run, they thereby avoided the real economic costs associated with
exclusion from international transactions. Moreover, it was widely believed that the Japanese Government
regulation effectively formed banks into a “convoy system”2 from which no weak bank would be allowed
to drop out. Gennotte and Pyle (1991) showed that, given subsidies from deposit insurance like that which
is implicit in a convoy system style of regulation, banks do in fact have an incentive to increase their asset
risk when facing tighter BIS-like minimum capital requirements. Indeed, the shift in asset risk can be
substantial enough to result in higher bank risk and probability of default after the minimum capital
requirements are imposed.
Deposit insurance incentives aside, Besanko and Kanatas (1996) point out that capital
requirements which force banks to substitute equity for deposit financing thereby potentially reduce
management’s equity stake. As a result, managers’ reward for ensuring that profits are realized on loans
is reduced, again with the result that tighter minimum capital standards perversely result in greater
probability of bank defaults. These effort-reduction moral hazard incentives are consistent with our
results, but not directly testable. Ancedotes go both ways.  For example, it’s often said that “loss of face”
and “cultural sense of responsibility” are much more important deterrents to moral hazard incentives in
Japan than in most countries. At the same time, Japanese banks’ aggressive loan pricing in the late 1980s-
early 1990s was often cited as evidence of empire-building, one of the more obvious agency problems.3
Our evidence suggests that the riskier loans made by the Japanese banks to meet the BIS
regulations were, if anything, ex ante unprofitable. Certainly the risky loans were ex-post unprofitable. It
is interesting, then, that Wagster (1996) reports a “…wealth gain for Japanese bank shareholders [from
                                                 
2 Hoshi (1994b) outlines several cases in which “[t]he Minis ry of Finance successfully encouraged
healthy financial institutions to absorb troubled financial institutions to avoid bank failures.” There is
some well-informed debate over the degree to which the convoy system had weakened by the late 1980s.
3 Indeed, some observers believe that Japanese banks’ cut-rate loan pricing was a major reason that the
BIS guidelines came about in the first place, i.e. though the stated objective was to level the playing field
for international banking, the real objective was to “level” the Japanese banks.
5the Basle Accord] of 31.63 percent.” Upon examination, we see that all these big wealth gains occurred in
the first half of 1987. In Section 6, we propose that these 1987 increases in Japanese bank share prices can
more plausibly be attributed to events other than Basle Accord announcements..
In the following section, we examine the time series evidence on aggregate Japanese bank
spreads and loan portfolio composition during the 1980s and early 1990s. In Section 3, we analyze the
cross-sectional relationship between city, trust, and long-term banks’ anticipated BIS capital deficiencies
in the late 1980s and their subsequent loan making and capital raising activities. In Section 4, we analyze
the lending behavior of the Regional II banks, and show that that those regional banks not doing
international business didn’t increase their loan risk as did the city banks and BIS-Regional II banks. In
Section 5, we provide a detailed description of loan loss reserve and write-off rules for Japanese banks.
The inflexibility of these rules played a major role in giving banks the incentive to increase their loan risk
in the face of the impending BIS capital requirements. Section 6 contains our analysis of the Japanese
banks’ stock price reactions to the Basle Accord. Section 7 contains a summary and discussion of the
results.
2. Overall Banking Trends in Japan
As can be seen from Fig. 1, Japanese banks’ profit margins both trended down and became more
erratic in the early 1980s.  The general down-trend in the profit margin resembles that in other countries.
Fig. 2 shows Japanese and U.S. banks’ rates of return on loans over the years 1984-1993.4 It can be seen
that the year-to-year variations in both countries’ bank returns tended to track each other very closely until
the fiscal year ending in 1990. In 1990, the average rate of return for Japanese banks increased  (from
about 5.32% in 1989 to about 6.58% in 1990), while on average U.S. bank returns decreased.
Japanese bank returns increased because end-of-year assets of large commercial banks in Japan
declined from 508 trillion yen in 1989 to about 491 trillion yen in 1990, while interest income climbed
                                                                                                                                      
4 Write-offs and allowances for loan losses have not been subtracted from the interest income in
computing the rate of return.
6from 27 trillion yen to 32 trillion yen5.  The leveling off in Japanese banks’ asset growth might in part be
attributable to soryo-kisei, a directive initiated by then-Minister of Finance Hashimoto, intended to
restrain banks in making real-estate-related loans and so, it was apparently believed, the increase in real-
estate prices. To implement it, the Ministry of Finance directed the financial institutions which it
supervised to not let their respective end-of-year level of real estate loans precede the previous year’s total
loans outstanding.6 Soryo kisei aside, however, Gennotte and Pyle also showed that financial institutions
may well voluntarily reduce their total loans (assets) outstanding as they substitute toward riskier loans in
the face of tightening capital constraints (Gennotte and Pyle (1991, Proposition 2)).
The promised interest rates on the banks’ loans also increased substantially in 1990. Bank of
Japan statistics7 show that in 1989 loans and discounts outstanding for all banks with a promised interest
rate of 7.25% and below were 27 times the value of loans and discounts with interest rates of 7.5% and
above. By 1990, loans with interest rates of 7.5% and above were 3 times the value of those with a rate of
7.25% and below. On average there was a twelve-fold increase in loans with interest rates greater than
7.5%. Of the 1990 loans with interest rates of 7.5% and above, 94% of them had interest rates between
7.5% and 9.0%; and for this major subset, there was a twenty-six fold increase in loans in 1990 compared
to 1989.
Unless there were substantial resets of coupon rates on “old” loans, the loans with interest rates
of 7.5% and above were presumably new loans. The increase in promised interest rates on loans might
simply have reflected a general increase in yields on Government securities. Short, medium, and long-
term yields in Japan rose from roughly the beginning of 1989 until the closing months of 1990. Moreover,
banks’ interest expense as a fraction of non-equity liabilities increased sharply from 4.83% in 1989 to
                                                 
5If  we measure the return as interest income divided by previous year-end assets,  the big increase “shows
up” in 1989---an increase of about 20%, nearly double that for U.S. banks.
6  We are indebted to Yasuhiko Tanigawa for orginally drawing our attention to this directive. We
understand that there was an unwritten MOF regulation that a bank’s assets at fiscal year end not exceed
that of the bigger banks to preserve the so-called “finance order,” or “goso-sendan-hoshiki.” This would
have required proportionate increases in all banks’ loan business if aggregate increases in lending were
not to be restricted.
7 Bank of Japan, 1992, Research and Statistics Department, Economic Statistics Annual, Table 71.
76.13% in 1990 (using end-of-year liability numbers8). How ver, if we look at the spread between loan
yields and the interest rate on deposits and debentures for “Ordinary Banks,”9  plotted in Fig. 3a, we can
see that after decreasing from around 3% in the mid-1970s to around 1.7% by 1987,  it had increased
again to about 2.2% by 1990. Fig. 3b also shows that, according to the OECD, Japanese banks’ interest
margins increased steeply in calendar year 1990 and 1991 as compared with U.S. banks. The higher
spread was maintained through 1991, even though the steepness of the yield curve declined in the 1989-
1990 period;  indeed, the yield curve was inverted for much of 1990.
On what types of loans were these higher spreads being earned?  One directly measurable
characteristic of loans is their maturity or duration. Two sources of evidence indicate that the maturity of
Japanese bank loans increased in the late 1980s. First, the Bank of Japan breaks out the Outstanding
Loans and Discounts of all Banks and City Banks into those with a maturity of less than 3 months, 3
months to 1 year, and more than 1 year.10 The “More than 1 year” category increased steadily from about
40% in the early 1980s to about 56% in 1991. Second, loan maturity on the borrower side increased --- as
Japanese non-financial firms built up accumulated earnings in the 1980s, they were increasingly able to
meet short-term funding needs internally and through equity cross-holdings and trade payables rather
than bank loans.11
If the term structure risk and/or default risk is higher for the longer maturity loans, higher
premiums for bearing that risk could explain higher steady-state spreads on loans. Moreover, if loan
values are not marked-to-market and instead spreads are calculated using accounting income after loss
provisions, an increase in loan risk will generate a transitory increase in spreads if accounting loan loss
provisions understate true expected losses.  Turning to the term structure risk, if the maturity of the loans
is increasing relative to deposits and debentures, then part of the spread may reflect a bigger gap between
                                                 
8Reported interest expense for large commercial banks increased from 23,847,400 million yen in 1989 to
29,334,600 million yen in 1990 while Nonbank Deposits, Bonds, and Other Liabilities decreased, and
Central Bank borrowing remained approximately constant. (Source: “Table 34, Income and Expenses of
Ordinary Banks,” Economic Statistics Annual, Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan,
March, 1992; Referenced Source: The Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan).
8the average maturity of bank loans and their funding.12  In fact, Bank of Japan statistics show that there
was a steep increase in 1990-1991 in the proportion of deposit funds coming from “Time Deposits with
Liberalized Interest Rates,” “Money Market Certificates,” and “Small denomination Money Market
Certificates.” We don’t have enough data to determine whether the increased duration of these funding
sources exactly matched the increased duration on the loans,  or do we know to what degree the loans
were variable rate and/or banks were hedging their interest rate risk, so we can’t rule out the possibility
that a bigger maturity gap may explain part of the higher spreads.
Another possibility is that, for a given borrower type, the ex ante default risk (p r period) is
higher on the longer maturity loans, so that the lengthening maturity of loans alone should have
commanded higher loss provisions. We can see from Fig. 3a that the yield on lending and the spread
between loan rates and funding costs move quite closely together. Indeed, banks’ yield on lending and 10-
year Government bond yields both increased about 43% between fiscal year 1988 and 1990. Term
structure risk aside, such co-movement between the default premium component of loan spreads and the
level and volatility of interest rates  is to be expected if default risk moves up and down with the level and
volatility of interest rates. Such co-movement in default risk and interest rates is typically what we see
empirically in other countries in the pricing of corporate debt (Gennotte and Marsh (1994) and the
references therein).
The 50 basis point increase in loan spreads, i.e.  from around 1.7%% by 1987 to about 2.2% in
1990, is an increase in the average spread across all loans in banks’ portfolios, both old and new. How
much of an increase in the risk of the average loan portfolio would it have taken to generate the 50 basis
point increase in average loan spreads? It is well known that the Black-Scholes option-pricing formula
can be used for pricing default risk (see Merton (1974)). Let’s assume that bank loans have a maturity of 5
                                                                                                                                      
11 The same trend toward increasing loan maturities has occurred in the U.S., except that in the U.S. the
replacement for short-term bank loans was the commercial paper market (the domestic corporate debt
market in Japan has been held back by onerous restrictions).
12Conceptually even a perfect match between average loan maturity and bond maturity would not be
sufficient --- the individual loans should be matched one-by—one on maturity with the Government
bonds, and then the average of the spreads calculated, i.e. here, the average of the spreads is not the same
as the spread of the average.
9years, that the loan-to-value ratio is 80%, and that the interest rate is 6.0%. Then, if the volatility of
percentage changes in the value of the collateral is constant over time and the value doesn’t typically jump
up or down sharply, a volatility of about 27% per annum in the value of that collateral would be consistent
with a 1.7% default premium on a real estate loan.13  With these same parameters, the volatility of the
collateral’s value would only have to increase to approximately 30% to justify an increase in the default
premium to 2.2%. That is, the volatility of the collateral value on the new loan portfolio would only have
to be about 3 percentage points higher to account for the observed 50 basis point increase in spreads.
Of course, the loan portfolio wouldn’t have turned over in this short period. Let’s suppose that
30% of the loans were new and, for further illustration, tha  rates were fixed on the “old loans,” and that
the default risk on these new loans were orthogonal to that on the current loans.  Then the default
premium would have had to be 3.36% on the new loans in order for the average spread to be 2.2%. The
volatility of the assets backing the new loans would then have had to be in the 35% range, i.e. eight
percentage points higher on the new loans. In practice, the new loan risk was undoubtedly not orthogonal
to that on the old loans. In fact, the increased concentration in commercial real estate-backed loans in
major urban areas in Japan presumably made bank loan portfolios even less diversified, even if all else
were equal. If so, the own-asset volatility of these new loans could have been even less than eight
percentage points higher than the old and at the same time have been commensurate with the increase in
loan spreads.
We now turn to the changes in banks’ loan portfolios in order to determine if there is any direct
evidence of an increase in their ex ante risk along with loan spreads. Not surprisingly, the much-discussed
shift toward real estate-related lending shows up strongly in the data. For example, Fig. 4 gives a bank-by-
bank breakdown of real-estate-related lending from 1986 to 1992. The increase in real-estate-related
lending is particularly evident for the city banks.
                                                 
13 For simplicity of illustration, the loan is taken to be a discount loan. Note that the important point in the
illustration concerns the relative change in the volatility --- the absolute level of the volatility could be re-
calibrated by changing the assumptions about the characteristics of the debt.
10
The 1980s shift to real estate lending and away from traditional loans can also be seen in the
aggregate statistics on Japanese bank lending by industry.14  If we interpret “kensetsu fudosan gyou” to be
commercial real estate loans, which in Japan as elsewhere are considered more risky than residential, then
commercial real estate increased substantially, from 11.0% of loans in 1980 to 17% in 1991. Housing
Funds (juutaku shikin), i.e. explicit loans for residential real est te, also increased slightly, from 9.0% to
10.5%, over the same period.15 L ans to Manufacturing and to Wholesale and Retail Trade decreased
from 32% and 25.5% respectively, in 1980, to 15.1% and 18% in 1990.16
The small increase in aggregate bank Housing Fund loans during the 1980s also conceals a
substantial “reshuffling” of All-Bank new Housing Fund loans among the three main bank lenders: the
city banks, regional banks, and shinkin banks. The proportion of new Housing Fund loans made by the
city banks increased dramatically during the 1980s---from about 27% in 1983 to about 42% in 1991. Not
all of the increase can be directly attributed to the BIS Accord, however. For example, the proportion of
new Housing Fund loans actually rose to 57% in 1989, before falling back to about 42% in 1991. Some of
the 1983-1989 undoubtedly reflects the relaxation of window guidance. The proportion of Housing Fund
loans made by the regional and shinkin banks dropped by a factor of 2 between 1983 and 1989, as did
their share of the consumer credit loan business.
Some of the banks’ shift away from traditional business loans toward real estate17 can be
explained by the steep increase in Japanese real estate prices in the 1980s. For example, the value of City
                                                 
14 Source: “Table 31: Outstanding Lendings of Commercial Banks by Industry,” Comparative Economic
and Financial Statistics: Japan and other Major Countries 1993,” International Division, Bank of Japan.
15 By way of comparison, in the U.S., roughly 30% of FDIC-insured commercial bank and trust loans,  or
about  12% of total loans and leases, were secured by non-farm, nonresidential properties at the end of
1991. Whilst it is hard to rely on cross-sectional comparisons of re l-estate related lending because many
loans classified as “non-real-estate” are often secured by land.  For example, it has been estimated that
50% - 70% of U.K. bank loans in the late 1980s were related in one way or another to property.
16 In spite of the evidence for this shift in lending, there was virtually no change in the c mposition of
collateral backing loans, or the ratio of secured to unsecured loans, according to Bank of Japan figures.
We don’t currently have a good explanation for this apparent disparity.
17While the shift to residential real estate doesn’t show up strongly in the Bank of Japan numbers, it
presumably would if we could consolidate in the seven housing loan companies (Nippon Housing Loan
Co., Japan Housing Loan Inc., Jyuso Inc., Daiichi Housing Loan Co., Housing Loan Service Co., Sogo
11
Banks’ new loans to Housing Funds (residential real estate) increased by about 580% from 1983 to 1990.
But still, over the same period, the number of new loans increased by 171%.
Do real-estate-backed loans as a class have a higher ex ante risk than banks’ “traditional”
industrial loans (of course, ex post the loans were risky!)? It is difficult to estimate x ante r al-estate-
related loan risk in any country, including Japan and the U.S., because transactions are infrequent and
appraisal values tend to be smoothed. In the U.S., Ross and Zisler (1991) estimated the annual volatility of
unlevered real estate returns to be in the 9% - 13% range based on the prices of REITs with primarily
non-residential holdings. The estimated volatility of Japanese land prices in the 1970s through 1990s,
using land prices as assessed by Japan’s Ministry of Land, are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the
volatility of national (unlevered) land prices is about 10.42% over the 1971-1996 period. For the period
1971-1986 which excludes the 1990s decline, it is 10.24%. Interestingly, these volatilities are reasonably
similar to the Ross and Zisler estimates for the U.S. Moreover, the volatility of real estate prices has more
or less mirrored the volatility of stock prices (or vice versa!), i.e. unlevered real estate prices ---
particularly in Tokyo and Osaka, have tended to have a beta of about one vis-a-vis equity returns. For
example, from 1978 to 1996, commercial land prices in Tokyo had a volatility of about 19.61%, while the
volatility of the Nikkei over the same period was 18.87%.18  Remembering that equity price changes partly
reflect corporate leverage, these estimates suggest that land-related loans carried considerable ex ant  risk.
In using the volatility of the prices of land to measure default risk on land-backed loans (via an
options-pricing model), we assume that banks don’t have any information that land was under-priced and
hence was a positive “alpha” investment. Models for national level mispricing of real estate involve
                                                                                                                                      
Jukin Co., and Chigin Seiho Housing Corp.), which are all joint ventures between banks, insurance
companies, and securities firms.
18 Moreover, it is not that these 1970s-1990s statistics pertain to an “unusual” period. Asakura (1993)
documents that prices of rice paddy land went from 100 yen (per acre) in 1877, to 250 yen in 1880, and
back to 45yen in 1885. If they were random points rather than after-the-fact extremal points, these figures
imply a land price volatility back then of 41% - 75% per annum.
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macroeconomic variables like inflation and growth, and it seems unlikely that banks in aggregate would
have inside information about such variables.19
As noted in the introduction, one of the problems with BIS capital guidelines is that they define
credit risk only in terms of broad classes of loans, just as we’ve done so far in the discussion, whereas
risks can (and can be made to) differ substantially among loans in the classes. Upon examination, many of
these loan-specific risk factors seem to have accentuated, not reduced, the ex ante risk of Japanese banks’
loans, particularly the real estate-related ones. For example, the real estate market in Japan can reasonably
be considered even more illiquid than other countries like the U.S., adding a substantial “appraisal
uncertainty” to the risk of real estate loans. Also, neither the degree of recourse or recovery on the loans,
nor detailed covenants governing banks’ abilities to intercede in borrowers’ operations under adverse
conditions (borrowers have an incentive to take on more risk under adversity) can be observed. But we do
know that Japanese banks’ reported at least considerable ex post difficulty in recovering real estate
collateral on defaulted loans.
Further, the ratio of the loan-to-collateralized real estate value for the typical Japanese
commercial borrower reportedly averaged around 80%. Loans in excess of 100% of stated collateral value
were not unknown.20 In fact, irrespective of the formal loan agreement, fi st ai  bank lenders are often
regarded as implicitly committing to add capital to keep group borrowers afloat if they get into financial
difficulty, i.e. first main banks are effectively residual claimants with “100%” financing.  Also the loan-to-
asset values for banks’ (especially long-term banks’) holdings in jusen  should mirror that of the jusen’s“
on a “flow through” basis (although the ex post settling up banks’ responsibilities for their respective
jusen-in-default suggests that the “flow through” is anything but clear).
                                                 
19 If banks did have information about real estate, they should be in the real estate business, not the
banking business (perhaps, with 100% loan-to-value ratios, they were!). Werner (1994) shows that
quarterly changes in Japanese land-related loans were closely related to quarterly changes in Japan’s net
capital flows over the 1979-1991 period. It seems plausible that this correlation makes the real-estate
loans more risky, e.g. it would certainly reduce the diversification in the banks’ loan portfolios. We are
still studying this result and its implications.
20 By way of comparison, in the U.S. the loan-to-value ratio on real estate was limited to about two-thirds
until 1982; following decontrol, it surged to 80% for some institutions. (It has now dropped back to about
2/3 after FIRREA).
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In addition to their increase in real estate lending, Japanese banks also appeared to have shifted
some of their remaining business lending to smaller enterprises. These enterprises have, on average,
higher volatility of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and, all else equal higher default risk. For
all banks, 41.6% of total outstanding loans and discounts went to “small enterprises” in 1982, but by
1989, that fraction had increased to 57.22%.21 Small enterprise “equipment financing”22 increased from
about 8.44% in 1982 to 16% in 1989. Loans to small and medium-size businesses which were guaranteed
by municipal entities (“shinyo hosho kyokai”) received a risk-weight of only 10% in the BIS calculations,
and banks were reportedly quite aggressive in making these kyoho kasidashi loans; this is undoubtedly
part of the explanation for the growth of loans to small enterprises, as well as direct evidence that the
banks were concerned with the BIS capital standards.
Of course, shifts in bank lending toward real estate also occurred in the U.S. and other countries
in the 1980s. In the U.S., for example, total loans secured by real estate increased from about 29% of total
FDIC-insured commercial bank and trust loans and leases to about 41% over the 1986-1991 period23,
while Commercial and Industrial Loans decreased from 34.2% to 27% over the same period. This is not
surprising given the world-wide trend toward declining demand and margins for traditional commercial
banking services, the widespread 1980s deregulation of banks’ lending activities, explicit and implicit
insurance, and possibly the world-wide prevalence of BIS and national capital requirements.
To sum up, we believe that the statistics on aggregate bank lending in Japan in the late 1980s
show a short-term increase in loan spreads which was both counter to past trends and to rates of return in
other countries. These increased spreads accompanied a discernible shift in banks’ loan portfolios toward
real estate. In the next section, we present evidence across individual banks that directly supports the
                                                 
21Source: “Table 60, Loans and Discounts of Banking Accounts of all Banks by Industry,” Economic
Statistics Annual, Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, March, 1992.
22This is not inconsistent with the trend toward real estate loan-related financing.  Nearly two-thirds of the
”equipment” financing is to real estate and services industry.
23”A Statistical Profile of the United States Banking Industry,” FDIC Division of Research and Statistics,
Table RC-8. (The FDIC numbers closely accord with the numbers in Table 31: Outstanding Lendings of
Commercial Banks by Industry, Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics: Japan and other Major
Countries 1993,” International Division, Bank of Japan).
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hypothesis that the BIS capital guidelines were an important force behind these aggregate Japanese
banking trends.
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3. Cross-Sectional Evidence for the City, Trust, and Long-Term Banks
The BIS capital standards began as a 1985 US-UK initiative, the stated objective of which was a
reduction in the risk of international banking transactions and a “levelling of the playing field” for banks.
A significant modification of the initial accord, due primarily to pressure from Germany and Japan,
allowed these countries to continue making loan loss reserves based on historical default rates and at the
same time count 45% of “hidden reserves” as Tier II capital. Thus, instead of applying U.S.-U.K.
accounting rules in which loan risk must be provisioned against (so that, term structure risk aside, the net
book value of a loan approximates its mark-to-market value), the German and Japanese treatment
introduced a mixture of non-GAAP valuation of loans with marked-to-market valuation of other assets
(i.e. the hidden reserves).   Negotiations concluded in December 1987 and the agreement was signed in
1988.24  Banks were required to have a 7.5% risk-weighted capital ratio by the end of 1990, of which
3.25% was to be in core capital (basic equity). On December 31, 1992 (March 31, 1993 for Japanese
banks), at the end of the phase-in period, the risk-weighted capital standard was stepped up to 8%, with
4% required to be in Tier I capital.25
The BIS capital standards, although often termed risk-based capital adequacy standards, can be
more correctly understood as accounting risk-based standards. That is, neither risk nor capital is measured
on a mark-to-market basis, but rather risk factors are assigned to categories of assets, and historical cost
accounting valuations are used in computing the capital ratios. Also, even though off-balance-sheet
commitments are taken into account, they are converted to on-balance-sheet equivalents and then assigned
to the various risk categories.
In 1986-1987, many banks around the world began to realize that they would probably be
considered under-capitalized by the international capital standards that later became the BIS. In
                                                 
24 Paragraphs 18 and 21 of the BIS Accord were amended in 1991 to strengthen the distinction between
general and specific provisions. The amendments effectively precluded supervisors from including any
specific provisions in Tier II capital.
25C.J. Thompson, ”The Basle Concordat: International Collaboration in Banking Supervision”; “Report of
the Basle Committee on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards,” in
Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks, Vol. I, Ed. by Robert C. Effros, IMF.
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particular, press coverage in the late 1980s increasingly speculated that the Japanese banks would have a
difficult time meeting the BIS standards.26 To improve their BIS ratios, banks had to increase their
reported capital and/or decrease their risk-weighted assets. One short-run way to increase reported
accounting capital is to increase the riskiness of loans and thus loan margins, but not make
commensurately higher loan loss provisions. This procedure simply borrows tomorrow’s profit in the form
of higher retained earnings today.
The evidence is that, at least in the U.S., banks do tend to manipulate loan loss provisions when
minimum capital requirements are binding. Banks can either “bend”accounting procedures for  a given set
of transactions, or they can carry out advantageous transactions when confronted with fixed accounting
procedures. They appear to do both. For example, Kim and Kross (1995) show that a 1989 change in
minimum capital requirements, along with a change in the capital ratio computation, caused U.S. banks
with low capital ratios to change their accruals so as to increase their capital ratios. Similarly, Stinson
(1991) finds that federally-regulated U.S. Savings and Loans adjusted the size of loss provisions to meet
net worth requirements when their net worth was close to the minimum required. Barth, Beaver, and
Wolfson (1990) find that U.S. banks use securities gains and losses and/or loan loss provisions to smooth
earnings. Williams (1996, p. 3) reports that “[U.S.] banks with inadequate risk-based capital increased
their equity relative to banks with sufficient risk-based capital after Basle was announced [but]… most of
the [post-Basle] change in equity was due to accounting manipulations and shifts of funds within bank
holding companies rather than to genuine increases in equity.”
To do a cross-sectional bank-by-bank analysis of the proposition that the Japanese banks facing
higher prospective capital inadequacies did increase loan risk, we assembled a time-series cross-section
database on the 11 city banks, 3 long-term credit banks, and 7 trust banks27 covering the period 1981-
1995. We begin the analysis at the end of fiscal year 1988, which is March 1989 for Japanese banks, for
                                                 
26For example, Euromoney estimated that on average Japanese banks Tier I capital was 2.76% in 1987
(Euromoney, July 1989, p. 63)
27 Boyd and Gertler (1993) show that, among U.S. banks, bank size is an important variable in explaining
shifts in asset composition etc.. We did not stratify our sample by size ---Japanese city, trust, and long-
term banks are all large by almost any standard, and indeed their record does tend to resemble that
reported by Boyd and Gertler for the large U.S. banks.
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three reasons. First, March 1989 is the first year that BIS ratios were reported by Japanese banks. Second,
negotiations concerning the definition of capital, inclusion of hidden reserves, countries to be included,
and the like, appeared to have taken place in earnest during 1987 and 1988, with a resolution taking
shape toward the end of 1988. The Accord was in reasonably final form by the end of 1988. Finally, the
Basle Accord was reported to have been implemented by the Ministry of Finance by administrative
guidance in 1988.
First, we determine whether banks with lower BIS capital ratios had higher subsequent growth
rates in risky lending. Risky lending is defined as real-estate related lending, i.e. loans to financial
institutions (non-banks), commercial real estate developers, and construction companies, divided by total
loans. The rank correlation between March 1989 BIS capital ratios and March 1989  March 1991 growth
rates in risky lending across all banks, i.e. across city, trust, and long-term banks taken together, was:
47.0),(ˆ 918989 =-ii
R REGRBISr               (1)
where r R is the rank correlation coefficient, 89iBIS is the reported BIS ratio for bank i  o  March
31,1989 (i.e. for fiscal year 1988), 9189-iREGR is the real-estate-related loan growth rate over the two
fiscal years March 1989 – March 1991, where “real-estate-related” is defined as loans to financial
institutions (non-banks), commercial real estate developers, and construction companies28 as a fraction of
total lending; and 21,...,1=i , the number of city, trust, and long-term banks in our sample. In (1), the
order of ranking is that higher BIS ratios are assigned lower BIS ratio ranks, and smaller growth rates in
real-estate-lending are assigned lower ranks. Thus, those banks with the worst BIS ratios in 1989 on
average increased their real-estate-related lending the most over the period 1989-91.
The rank correlation in (1) is a robust measure of association between banks’ 1989 BIS capital
ratios and their subsequent lending. If, however, this association is instead fitted using a linear regression,
much the same result is obtained:
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The multiple R2 is 33%, and the negative coefficient indicates that banks with lower BIS capital ratios in
March 1989 had higher growth rates of real-estate-related lending over the next two years.
The rank correlation between BIS capital ratios and subsequent risky lending for all banks is of
roughly the same magnitude in the following two years,  0.49 in March 1990, and 0.51 in March 1991.
Then, in March 1992, by which time it would have been  too late to try to “enhance” capital ratios to meet
the requirements which became binding in March,1993, the correlation dropped to 0.02.
The increase in loan risk over the years 1989 to 1991 is likely to have been even greater for the
capital-deficient banks than we’ve estimated. The increase in real-estate related lending would, all else
equal, have reduced the diversification of default risk in the banks’ loan portfolios. Moreover, the fraction
of all banks’ loans going to small and medium-sized businesses increased from 56% in 1986 to 70% in
1989,29 and all else equal, these smaller businesses would have a higher volatility of underlying asset
value. The BIS capital standards simply treat all commercial loans as stand-alone and give them a 100%
risk weight. Thus, these new loans continued to receive a 100% risk weighting despite reduced
diversification of default risk and likely greater volatility of the value of assets underlying the loans.
The BIS rules allow 45% of the hidden reserves of Japanese banks to be counted as Tier II
capital. Thus, even if Japanese banks met the 7.5% 1990 capital requirement and had been “on track” to
meet the 8% 1992 requirement, the stock market slide which began when trading recommenced after the
1990 New Year holidays would have caused an unforeseen decline in hidden reserves. If the BIS
standards influenced Japanese banks’ lending, we might expect a “second wave” of riskier lending after
1990.
The Nikkei had decreased  32% from its December 1989 peak by the end of March 1991. The
rank correlation between banks’ 1991 BIS capital ratios and their subsequent risky lending is indeed
strong and positive; it is: 51.0),(ˆ 939191 =-ii
R REGRBISr . Moreover, if this correlation is due to the drop in
                                                 
29 Source: “Table 64, Loans and Discounts of Banking Accounts of all Banks by Industry,” Economic
Statistics Annual, Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, 1995.
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hidden reserves, we should also expect to find a direct relationship across banks between the changes in
those hidden reserves and growth in risky lending. The correlation between the drop in banks’ hidden
reserves from March 1989 to March 1991 and the growth rates in their real estate related lending over the
subsequent two years is 54% for all banks, and 31% for city banks.30
If banks with BIS capital deficiencies were making riskier, under-provisioned loans to
enhance their retained earnings and thus Tier I plus Tier II capital, retained earnings would have had to
increase. The correlation between banks’ risky lending over the March 1989 – March 1991 period and
changes in retained earnings over the same period was 47% for all banks, and 17% for city banks. These
positive correlations are consistent with the hypothesis that the higher yields on riskier loans did indeed
increase retained earnings and thus Tier II capital.
So far, we have used banks’ published or estimated BIS ratios as a measure of their potential
capital shortfall in meeting the guidelines. However, because the guidelines didn’t become fully binding
until the end of fiscal year 1992 (i.e. March 1993 for Japanese banks), it could be argued that it was the
projected shortfall as of 1989 in the ratio which would have been the most important stimulus to bank
behavior. We estimated bank i’s March 1993 capital deficiency as projected in, say, March 1989, as
follows:
    %]8[)](%)8[( 93/389/391/3,93/3,
89 xsTotalAssetxBISsTotalAssetxsTotalAssetCD iii ¸-=  (3)
where: 89iCD is the capital deficiency for bank i at the end of March 1989, and where we assume that
bank i had perfect foresight with respect to its BIS asset growth from 1989 to 1993.31 Since the published
                                                 
30 In this calculation, the decline in hidden reserves is standardized by any capital surplus over the BIS
requirements that banks had achieved by March 1989 (their “on track” level of capital). If the percentage
change in hidden reserves instead of this standardization is used in the calculations, the rank correlations
are 15% for all banks and 20% for city banks.
31 For banks to perfectly forecast BIS asset growth, they would have had to be able to perfectly forecast the
relative growth rates of assets in the various BIS asset categories. In fact, banks which increased their total
lending through risky lending would rationally have forecast the higher capital that would be required
come March 1993. (Note that our variable REGR, i.e. real-estate-related growth rate of risky lending, is
always defined as the growth rate in risky lending as a fraction of total lending; there is no induced
correlation between capital deficiency and growth in real-estate-related lending which would occur if
capital deficiency were computed using 1993 total assets which includes real-estate-related loans).
20
BIS ratio is used to calculate capital at the end of March 1989, hidden reserves are taken into account,
because they are included in Tier II capital.
The bank with the biggest capital deficiency in March 1989 by this measure, i.e. the bank which
was “at the bottom,” is given the highest rank. Using the convention that the bank with the biggest growth
in real-estate-related lending from the end-of-March 1989 to the end of March 1993 had the highest rank,
the rank correlation between the estimate of capital deficiency and growth in real-estate-related-lending is,
for all banks together:
61.0),(ˆ 939089 =-ii
R REGRCDr        (4)
For city banks alone, the rank correlation is 75%. If capital deficiency is calculated similarly in 1991, the
correlation between that capital deficiency and subsequent growth in real-estate-related lending is 0.57 for
all banks, and 0.80 for city banks.
Of course, these rank correlations are computed across a relatively small number of banks. If we
regarded these banks as a sample from a large population of all banks, the standard error would indeed be
large --- approximately 1 3/ n -  where n=21 for city, trust, and long-term banks taken together. But
the correlations just reported are actually those for the p pulations of banks, not for a sample. Any
statistical error in the correlations stems from measurement errors in the true capital shortfall and growth-
in-risky-lending variables. We have no precise way of assessing the likely magnitude of this error.
However, we’ve found that the rank correlations are remarkably robust to alternative measures of the
variables.
Horiuchi and Shimizu (1996) find that, across the 21 city, trust, and long-term banks grouped
together, the banks with the bigger capital deficiencies during the 1990-1995 period had the higher
growth rates of lending and the higher rates of change in loans standardized by total bank assets. While
their estimation approach, sample period, and bank grouping are quite different from that here, their
results are consistent with our’s. However, we emphasize that it is the growth rate in risky (real-estate-
related) lending which was associated with capital deficiencies which drives the results. For example, the
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rank correlation between BIS rankings at March 31, 1990 and growth in non-real-estate-related lending
over the subsequent two-year period for city banks is zero.32
So far, results have been presented for the 21 city, trust, and long-term banks as a population. We
now examine city banks and trust banks separately; since there are only three long-term banks, we can’t
meaningfully apply the same procedure to them. It turns out that there is a degree of heterogeneity
between the city and trust banks, and it is in a direction that seems consistent with the BIS hypothesis. In
March 1989, 52.0),(ˆ 918989 =-ii
R REGRBISr for the city banks. However, the rank correlation is –0.21 for
the trust banks, i.e. trust banks with lower BIS capital ratios decreased their real-estate-related lending.
But  the trust banks’ BIS capital ratios were all above 8% in 1989. Indeed, all but one had ratios above
8.5%. Over the entire period 1989 – 1993 for which BIS ratios were published, no trust bank had a
reported ratio less than 8%.  Questions have been raised concerning the reported numbers for trust banks,
e.g. the Economist (October 19, 1996, pp. 78-79) referred to them as “Distrust Banks.” If we take the
Trust Banks’ reported BIS ratios at face value, then an interpretation of these results is that is that those
banks meeting the requirements with the least margin of safety were the most cautious in their lending
decisions. If we look just at the city banks (i.e. exclude the trust banks and long-term banks) when
calculating of the rank correlation between March 1991 reported BIS ratios and 1991-1993 growth in
risky lending, we find 31.0),(ˆ 939191 =-ii
R REGRBISr .
Implicit in the argument that banks used their lending activities to help meet their BIS capital
standards is the requirement that profits be a potentially important source of increases in their capital.
Table 2 provides evidence on the relative importance of retained earnings versus new shares issues as
sources of equity capital. In this table, the year-by-year ratio of proceeds from new share issues to total
proceeds from new share issue plus the unappropriated retained earnings33 is giv n for each of the city
                                                 
32 As another reference point, we computed the rank correlation between estimates we made of the city
banks’ BIS ratios in 1987 and their 1987-89 growth in non-real-estate related lending. It again turned out
to be 0.036, i.e. again, a negative relationship between capital deficiency and change in loans outstanding
appears to be due entirely to the growth in real-estate-related lending .
33 The data for proceeds from new issues was taken from Toyo Keizai’s Japan Company Handbook. Using
the information there, we calculated the number of shares and multiplied it by the issue price to get
proceeds. We accounted for public issues at market price, so-called mid issues to shareholders at half the
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banks. It can be seen from Table 2 that roughly half the equity funding for many banks in the 1988 - 1990
fiscal years came from retained earnings, and roughly half from new share issues.
Since funds from both new share issues and retained earnings count toward Tier I capital, banks
with an anticipated capital deficiency vis-à-vis the BIS standards would have an incentive to raise funds
from either source. All else equal, we expect them to choose the cheapest source. An important factor in
determining the relative cost of outside and inside equity is the degree of asymmetry in information
between that available to the stock market and that available to internal managers. For example, if
managers issue shares when, based on their inside information, they think that the firm’s shares are
overpriced, then we’d expect rational investors who realize that managers know more than they do to
“mark down” the price they’re willing to pay. Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that this
information asymmetry thus results in a “pecking order” for funding sources in which internal funds will
be used before resorting to external funding.  The degree of asymmetry between insiders and outsiders was
arguably substantial at the beginning of the 1990s as stock market prices began to slide and there was
much public speculation about the effects thereof on banks’ hidden reserves and the extent of problem
loans. The information asymmetry is potentially more severe for the weaker banks, a conjecture which is
supported by results by Cornett and Tehranian (1994). They find that announcements of equity issues by
U.S. banks with capital deficiencies vis-à-vis regulatory standards are on average associated with declines
in the prices of banks’ stocks, which suggests that information asymmetry is indeed more likely the higher
a bank’s capital deficiency.34 Compounding any disincentive effects of potential asymmetry on share
issues was Ministry of Finance “guidance” which essentially ruled share issues out after 1990.
                                                                                                                                      
market price (in proportion to shares outstanding --- like rights), and issues to specific buyers at a price set
by the bank (private placements). We excluded convertible bond issues and stock splits. We aggregated
the proceeds from the new share issues by fiscal year and expressed them as a ratio of unappropriated
earnings plus the proceeds from new issues to get the numb rs which are given in Table 2. The
unappropriated retained earnings numbers include dividends on the basis that dividends are a control
variable, and thus contribute to the banks’ ability to meet BIS guidelines. However, we re-computed the
numbers in Table 2 where dividends are taken out of retained earnings and verified that their treatment is
not important.
34 Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1995) report that accounting items such as banks’ non-performing loans
and fair values of securities and loans which are disclosed but not recognized in financial statements
under SFAS 107 are significant in explaining cross-sectional equity prices. At least in the U.S., the
implication is that investors derive information from these items in accounting reports; their absence in
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If there is a pecking order running from inside to outside funding, then we would expect to see a
tendency for the banks to only raise outside funds when they’ve exhausted their inside funding. Thus,
holding total equity funding constant, we would expect to see banks which made riskier-higher yield loans
to generate short-run increases in retained earnings to have lower outside funding.  To investigate these
possibilities further,  we computed the correlation for each city bank between its year-to-year outside
funding and the year-to-year fraction of its loans tied to real estate over the period 1987 to 1992. These
correlations are negative for all long-term, trust, and city banks except IBJ and Sumitomo Trust.35 The
average correlation (including the outlier for IBJ) is -0.37. These correlations are consistent with the
hypothesis that banks which were making higher yielding and riskier loans to generate retained earnings
because of capital deficiencies relative to the BIS standards faced less pressure to go to the external capital
markets. Note that  this negative correlation between real-estate related lending and external equity issues
is the opposite of what we would have expected if real-estate lending and new share issues were all being
driven by real estate prices. That is, most of the share issues occurred in a three year period of high share
prices. We know from empirical work by Marsh (1982) and others that on average corporate stock issues
increase when stock prices increase, and it can be argued that a major “fundamental” behind high stock
prices in Japan was high real estate prices, i.e. one couldn’t conclude that stocks were overvalued in Japan
in the late 1980s unless one concluded that real estate was overvalued. So if real estate lending went up
when real estate prices and stock prices were going up, we would have expected to find a positive
correlation between real-estate related lending and external equity issues.
Whilst the evidence is consistent with banks on average resorting to outside equity issues only
when they were unable to generate accounting equity increases internally, we would also expect to see a
total capital demand effect. That is, banks with bigger capital deficiencies needed bigger increases in
capital from all sources. We’ve already shown that the bigger a bank’s capital deficiency, the more likely
                                                                                                                                      
Japanese reports presumably reduces investor information and increases asymmetry between the level of
their information and management’s.
35 The correlations are 0.68, -0.75, -0.08, -0.55, -0.73, -0.24, -0.23, -0.78, -0.70, -0.10, -0.96, -0.86, -0.71,
-0.34, -0.18, -0.13, 0.05, -0.18, -0.24, -0.64, -0.01 for IBJ, LTCB, NCB, DKB, HTB, BOT, SAKURA,
MB, FUJI, SUM. BK, DAIWA BK, SANWA, TOKAI, ASAHI, MITSUI TR, MITSUBISHI TR,
SUMITOMO TR, YASUDA TR, NIPPON TR, TOYO TR, and CHUO TR respectively.
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it endeavored to generate retained earnings from riskier, higher margin, loans. To complete our cross-
sectional analysis then, we looked at the rank correlation between banks’ estimated BIS capital ratios in
March 1987 and their new equity funding over the period April 1987 to March 1993. This correlation is
quite low for city banks, 0.08, and  for trust banks, 0.14, though it is 0.50 for the long-term banks (of
which there are only three!).
These correlations between BIS ratios and equity funding suggest that, at least for city banks and
trust banks, asymmetric information problems could have been important enough to make new equity
issues an expensive source of funds. Indeed, the city banks, for whom the correlation between new issues
and BIS capital deficiencies are the lowest, had the highest correlation between risk-taking and those
deficiencies. It is plausible that the asymmetry is most likely to be highest for banks doing the most risk-
taking which on average have the biggest capital deficiencies, consistent with Cornett and Tehranian’s
(1994) results for the U.S.
To summarize the results in this section, there is consistent evidence that, among Japanese banks,
the ones with bigger late-1980s capital deficiencies vis-à-vis the impending BIS standards tilted their loan
portfolios toward higher margin/higher ex ant  isk loans. Given the loan loss provision and write-off
rules, these shifts generated higher short-term retained earnings growth and thus short-term improvement
in their BIS ratios. This behavior is strikingly consistent with evidence that U.S. banks which are up
against minimum capital standards do, on average, adjust discretionary accounting items to help meet the
standards
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4. Cross-Sectional Evidence for the Regional Banks
The evidence that we’ve presented so far is consistent with the hypothesis that, in the late 1980s
and early 1990s,  the major Japanese banks’ lending decisions were strongly influenced by the then-
impending BIS capital regulations. For these banks, not meeting the BIS standards, which would have
meant exclusion from international business, would have been life threatening. In this section, we look at
the lending decisions of a set of regional Japanese banks for which failure to meet the BIS standards
would have had little, or no, consequence.
We collected data for the thirty-seven “Regional II” banks.36 These banks are much smaller than
the city, trust, and long-term banks. For example, the average size of city banks’ loan portfolios is some
thirty times that of these Regional II banks (the median is 46 times). Of the thirty-seven Regional II
banks, twelve actually report BIS capital ratios.37  Nine of these appear to have some overseas operations,
so we put them in a separate c tegory which we call the “BIS Regional Banks.” The remainder of the 37
will be referred to as the “Non-BIS Regional Banks.”
We begin by comparing aggregate lending by the BIS Regional Banks with aggregate lending by
the Non-BIS Regional banks. Fig. 5 contains a plot of these two groups’ cumulative growth in real estate-
related lending, defined as above as loans to construction companies, real-estate companies, and finance
companies, as a percentage of total loans. The lending for BIS and non-BIS banks is standardized to have
the same 1986 base of 100 --- in 1986, real-estate related loans were actually 24.2% of total loans for the
non-BIS banks versus 18.3% for the BIS banks. As can be seen, the BIS banks consistently have a higher
growth rate in risky lending after 1986, when the capital guidelines began to take shape. By 1993, 22.1%
of their loans were real-estate-related versus 24.6% for the non-BIS banks. After the stock market crash
which began in 1990, risky lending declined for both BIS and non-BIS banks, but less so for the former.
                                                 
36 The “Regional II” terminology derives from the “second association” of regional banks to which they
belong. When these second-association banks were converted from sogo (mutual) banks to ordinary banks,
there already existed a “first association of regional banks” or Regional Banks I.
37 Here, the names of these twelve.
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We turn now to estimation of the cross-sectional relationship between individual banks’ capital
deficiencies vis-à-vis the BIS requirements and their lending activities.38 For BIS Regional Banks, the
relationship is consistent with the earlier results for the city, trust, and long-term banks. The rank
correlation between the 9 BIS Regional Banks’ BIS capital ratios at the end of March 1991 and the
growth in their real-estate-related lending over the March 1991 - March 1993 period is 0.17 i.e. BIS
Regional banks with lower capital had a higher rate of subsequent increase in real-estate related lending.
   These results for the BIS Regional Banks are quite consistent with those for the city, trust, and
long-term banks reported in Section 3. The consistency is particularly reassuring in view of the much
smaller size of the regional banks, in light of Boyd and Gertler’s (1993) finding that, in the U.S., bank
size seems to be an important variable in explaining shifts in asset composition. Moreover, the lower
correlation between BIS Regional Bank capital deficiencies and risk-taking is quite plausible since these
regional banks presumably didn’t have as much (everything) to lose if they failed to meet the BIS
standards.
We turn now to the Non-BIS Regional Banks. To calculate the relationship between their level of
capital and risk-taking, we needed to construct synthetic BIS ratios since the Non-BIS banks don’t report
BIS capital ratios. To do this, we applied the BIS rules to the balance sheet items for the non-BIS banks.
Unfortunately, we had no information on hidden reserves or subordinated debt.39 Before proceeding, we
checked how well our synthetic ratios estimated the reported BIS ratios for the BIS regional banks. In
1989 and 1990, for example, the rank correlation between our synthetic ratio and the reported ratio was
0.57 and 0.62 respectively.
Using the synthetic BIS ratio in March 1989, we found that its cross-sectional rank correlation
with growth in real-estate-related lending from 1989-1991 was 0.091. The correlation between the
                                                 
38 We tried using the market value of equity, divided by total assets, as a measure of equity (and thus of
the “true” bad loan situation if the stock market had good information about the loan quality). The rank
correlation between banks capital adequacy using March 1990 marked-to-market equity and the official
BIS numbers was -0.24. Perhaps this means that the market is not fooled by the official numbers, but we
have no way of independently verifying that the mark-to-market equity value is a reasonably measure.
39Horiuchi and Shimizu (1996) report that subordinated debt has become an important component of BIS
(Tier II) capital beginning in the early 1990s, but at March 31, 1990, the date at which we construct the
synthetic BIS ratio, subordinated debt was only 0.02% of assets.
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synthetic 1991 ratio and 1991-1993 lending was -0.14. That is, the relationship is, if anything, of the
“wrong sign” to be consistent with lending behavior which mimics that of the BIS-affected banks. We
interpret this absence of relationship for Non-BIS Regional Banks to be strong support for our hypothesis
that the BIS capital guidelines induced risky lending  --- when banks are not affected by BIS, the effect
disappears.
The time series behavior of our synthetic BIS ratios provide another piece of evidence in support
of the hypothesis that the BIS capital requirements had a causal effect on bank lending. The nine BIS
Regional Banks’ rankings in terms of their synthetic capital ratio was remarkably stable from year-to-year
up until 1988. The correlation between rankings in adjacent years was in the 91%-93% range. From 1989
through 1991, however, the rankings based on the synthetic ratio became much more volatile, e.g. the
rank correlation was only 37% between the 1990 and 1989 rankings. After 1991, the rankings again
changed little from year-to-year, e.g. the rank correlation between 1992 and 1991 was 98%. For the Non-
BIS Regional Banks, the rankings were much more stable; even the correlation of the March 1989
ranking and March 1990 ranking was 81%. A reasonable inference is that the BIS Regional Banks were
more active in influencing their BIS capital ratios in the 1989 – 1991 period than their non-BIS brethren.
A final thread of evidence for the influence of the BIS capital guidelines on bank behavior
consists of the relative shifts in BIS Regional Banks’ and Non-BIS Regional Banks’ holdings of
Government securities. Variation in these holdings is potentially revealing because national Government
securities had zero risk weight in calculation of the BIS ratios, while other securities have weights ranging
from 20% to 100%. Fig. 6 shows both the BIS banks’ and the non-BIS banks’ holdings of Government
securities (excluding Local Government securities) as a fraction of total securities held, from March 1986
through March 1993. (The period March 1986 through March 1993 begins when the BIS capital
guidelines started becoming a possibility). As can be seen, the BIS banks and the non-BIS banks
substituted Government for non-Government securities to roughly the same degree from March 1986 to
March 1989.  After March 1989, however, the changes in the Government securities holdings of BIS and
non-BIS Regional banks diverged substantially.
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The non-BIS banks held their Government securities positions relatively constant from 1989 to
1990, and then reduced them by 12% in the next two years. The reduction was possibly due to term
structure movements. The yield curve was essentially flat at the beginning of 1990, had a slight positive
slope of 10 basis points in August and September 1990 (the 10 year Government rate was 8.1% and the 3-
month CD/Time deposit rate was 7.91%), became inverted for the remainder of 1990 and 1991, and then
flattened out again at the beginning of 1992. However, the BIS banks, which presumably faced the same
term structure (we have no information on the maturity or exact composition of their holdings),
maintained their positions, though there was some year-to-year variability. One motivation for this
behavior by the BIS Regional Banks would have been a desire to remain more heavily invested in
Government securities, all else equal, because they carried a zero risk weight in the calculation of the BIS
capital ratio.
In summary, the results for the regional banks corroborate our results that the enactment of the
BIS capital standards led to increases in risky loans by Japanese banks. In the next section, we discuss the
Japanese rules for loan provisioning and write-off in detail. We argue that, in the case of Japan, it was not
the discretionary nature of the rules but rather their rigidity that led to increased loan risk, i.e. a situation
in which asset choice is endogenous and loss rules are inflexible is equivalent to a situation where assets
are fixed but rules can be manipulated.
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5. The Bad Debt Reserve and Write-off System
Japanese banks’ ability to use their risky lending activities to enhance their BIS capital ratios was
all the more effective because loan loss reserves weren’t perfectly adjusted to reflect the higher expected
default rates on the riskier loans. In fact, Japanese banks’ loan loss reserves were determined by applying
inflexible “rearview” rules. Perhaps such rules might have been adequate, or at least not relevant, when
bank lending policy was tightly controlled by window guidance, but it is generally agreed that window
guidance was itself substantially relaxed by the mid-1980s (e.g. Rhodes and Yoshino (1996)).
Reserves against bad loans appear to have been  introduced in Japan in 1964. Banks were then
required to make a general bad debt reserve equal to 0.42%  of outstanding loans, and the provisions
against income which were credited to the bad debt reserve were tax deductible. The bad debt reserve
requirement was then reduced 5 times to reach its current level, which is a tax deductible 0.3% for
domestic loans and loans to OECD countries.40  We understand that the adjustments leading to the 0.3%
rate reflected default experience prior to 1985.
Making the tax-deductible allowance for loan losses a fixed percentage of loans does have the
advantage that it makes it impossible for banks to manipulate the level of loan loss reserves. Since general
provisions are tax deductible and count as Tier II capital, Japanese banks might have had an incentive to
over-provision (just as U.S. banks did under similar tax rules in the 1980s). In the absence of a fixed loan
loss rule, banks might also have had the opposite incentive to make reserves “too low” in order to disguise
a deteriorating quality of  its loan portfolio if they believed that it would “fool” investors or regulators.
These pros of the fixed rule notwithstanding, however, a fixed loan loss allowance doesn’t,  ipso facto,
respond to changes in the ex ante riskiness of loans.  Most obviously the reserve allowance is invariant in
the face of  a shift in steady-state risk. But more subtly, it doesn’t reflect changes in the timing at which
uncertainty surrounding  loan repayments is resolved: since the reserve is “reset” each year at 0.3% of the
loan balance, any reserves  which are “unused” for write-offs simply reduce the amount of provisions
                                                 
40Source: “The banking system in Japan,”  Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan, Zenginkyo,
1989, Tokyo,  pp. 86-87.
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which are required to achieve the 0.3% reserve requirement in the following year.41 “Specific provisions”
are essentially identical to write-offs insofar as they are specific to loans and are not accumulated in a
reserve account if not used in the financial year; the only point of difference seems to be that specific
provisions are only 50% tax deductible, whereas write-offs are fully deductible. Thus even if the
characteristics of loans or economic conditions change so that there is an increase in the number of  loans
which will likely default in a subsequent period, there is no requirement to build up reserves
accordingly.42
A factor which might explain post-mid-1980s regulatory forebearance in Japan is that
inadequacies in accounting for potential loan losses are, at least in part, offset by another accounting
distortion---the “hidden reserves,” i.e. unrealized gains on assets, especially equity holdings, which were
stated at book value. Certainly it is reasonable to assume that bank managers, or their regulators, should
be able to roughly associate bad debt allowances with these hidden reserves---risk controllers in large
financial institutions typically try to mark-to-market and hedge the risk of liquid assets at least daily.
However,  the hidden reserves declined as equity values declined, just at the time that the big increase in
defaults began to occur---in general, more than a dollar of hidden reserves is required per dollar of
“required” bad debt reserves and write-offs  because hidden reserve values are likely to vary inversely with
                                                 
41This treatement is in stark contrast to that in the U.S.: “Amounts of bad debt deductions for income tax
purposes are includable in taxable income of later years only if the bad debt reserves are used subsequently
for purposes other than to absorb bad debt losses.”
42 The loss reserve provisioning procedures in Japan contrast with that in the U.S. and other countries.
U.S. authorities don’t have fixed rules of regulatory accounting for allowances for loan losses (possibly
because fixed rules can be “gamed”). The S.E.C., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the
F.D.I.C. all recommend a “building block” approach to determining the adequacy of allowances.
Considerations include: specific loans with potential losses; historical experience in default on various
pools of loans, and their volume, maturity and composition; off-balance sheet credit risks; lending policies
and procedures; and economic conditions. Ultimately, bank examiners judge the adequacy of the reserves.
Tax deductibility seems to be  “automatic” if the provisions are sanctioned by the examiners. Furth ,
industry opinion seems to be that there is a substantial equivalence between GAAP (FASB Statement No.
5) and the regulatory accounting procedures: “In practice, few differences appear to exist between the total
[allowance for loan and lease losses] for RAP [Regulatory Accounting Procedures] and GAAP, although
differences often appear among components justifying the total allowance” (Baskin (1992, p. 95)). Using
F.D.I.C. statistics for (federally) insured commercial banks and trust companies, the ratio of  “Allowance
for Loan & Lease Losses” as a fraction of “Total Loans & Leases” in the U.S. has been in the vicinity of
2.6% since 1987. Prior to that, it increased from about 1% at the beginning of the 1980s to about 1.6% in
1986.
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loan losses. Interestingly, the BIS applies a 55% discount to the value of hidden reserves as a component
of Tier II capital, but the rationale for the discount appears to be that it is an allowance for capital gains
taxes and perhaps market illiquidity, not that equity holdings are a poor hedge against loan defaults.
Until 1994, it appears to have been very difficult for Japanese banks to write off loans. Even if a
write-off was not deductible for tax purposes, it could not be taken under MOF guidelines unless the
borrower was bankrupt or had been insolvent for two years. Since February 1994, banks have been
permitted to establish Write-off Special Accounts. The Special Account can be established when: (1) the
borrower’s business is unlikely to improve, or the borrower has suffered a substantial loss due to natural
disaster or business decline; in this case, the establishment of the Special Account requires the approval of
the Japanese tax authorities; (2) the borrower has been the subject of a suspension of trade at the Clearing
House, petition for commencement of bankruptcy, reorganization and restructuring procedures, etc.; in
this case, the bank may, at its discretion, write off 50% of the total amount of the loan  (less the value of
collateral) at the time of occurrence of the event. It appears that a tax deduction is allowed at the time the
Special Account is established. When loan default appears certain, the loan can be written off against the
Special Account. In addition to the amount which can be transferred to the Special Account pursuant to
conditions (1) or (2), banks may also transfer additional money into the Special Account without it being
tax deductible. In this case, the banks must file a report with the tax authorities.
Past regulatory tightness on write-offs may be in part explained by Japanese banks’ reluctance to
foreclose on problem loans long beyond the point at which bankers in other countries would have.  Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) have in fact presented evidence that such Japanese bank relationships
with borrowers tend to help reduce bankruptcy costs.  But there are also potential cons. Obviously, there
will be some instances when problem loans are better handled by “workout specialists” and/or a change in
the borrower’s management is warranted, which may or may not be expedited by a relationship bank.
Economists have also long pointed to43 the “moral hazard” that managers of failing financial institutions
have an incentive to increase the riskiness of their operations. Moreover, one suspects that banks’
                                                 
43 And the U.S. experience with failed financial institutions affirmed!
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monitoring skills may be better (or more apparent) on a relatively “isolated case” basis than in a situation
like that in 1990s Japan with widespread problem loans due to causes largely beyond any bank’s control.
The write-off rules could also have been consistent with banks’ own interests (and thus those of
their “regulators”) if banks were concerned with their BIS capital standards, as we’ve argued the evidence
suggests that they were. Assuming that general provisions are tax deductible and specific provisions are
not, it is straightforward to show that, given the BIS treatment, the order of desirability of ways of
handling defaults are:
general provision > not recognized > write-off >= specific provision
That is, banks  prefer not recognizing bad loans over writing them off; all else equal, the BIS effect of the
former outweighs the tax advantage of the latter.
6. BIS Events and the Behavior of Japanese Banks’s Stock Prices
We’ve argued that Japanese banks increased the risk of their loan portfolios when it became clear
in 1989 that capital guidelines would be imposed on international banks, and again following the adverse
effect of the stock market crash on their hidden reserves. As Gennotte (1990) pointed out, deposit
insurance subsidies and other incentives like income from continued international business could, in
principle, induce banks to compete so much to book riskier loans that at the margin those loans become
unprofitable. So far, we’ve not examined whether the marginal loans were in fact unprofitable, i.e.
whether the premiums charged on the loans with higher ex ante risk were insufficient compensation for
the added risk. If the banks’ were incented by the BIS capital regulations to make negative NPV loans,
their true mark-to-market capital positions would have even worse, and the BIS effects greater, than in our
estimates.
Suppose that we assume that information about Japanese banks’ lending policies and loans was
available to the stock market, and that the market rationally valued their stocks on the basis of this
information. Then banks’ stock prices would reflect updates in the market’s estimate of changes in loan
risk and profitability due to the BIS capital standards.  In fact, Wagster (1996) recently reported that
“…shareholders of Japanese banks experienced …a large cumulative wealth gain of 31.63 percent
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indicat[ing] that Japanese bank shareholders benefited from the Basle accord.” Of course, it is always
possible that stock prices had earlier anticipated negative effects and that the announcements were only
“good news” relative to those earlier downgrades in prices. But let’s examine Wagster’s cross-sectional
regression of stock returns for banks, which includes a portfolio of Japanese banks, at the announcement
dates that he considers.  Dummy variables are included in the regr ssion  for the weeks in which BIS
(Basle) announcement effects are hypothesized to occur, and the regression captures market-wide
movements in stock prices and interest rates. The regression is:
å ++++++= JBtLtSttNWtJBJBt eDIIRRR ~~~~~~ 4322521 aa dbbbba               (5)
where JBtR
~
is the rate of return on a portfolio of Japanese banks in week t; WtR
~
is th  rate of return on the
Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index in week t; tNR 225
~
is the rate of return on the Nikkei
225 stock index in week t; StI
~
 is the change in the 3-month Japanese inter-bank rate, LtI
~
 is the change
in yields on 10-year JGBs, aD  is a dummy variable which equals 1 for the week in which the a’th
unanticipated Basle announcement is held to have occurred, and da is the r te of return attributable to that
a’th announcement. Wagster identified 18 announcement events.
It is interesting that most of the 31.63% gain on the Japanese bank stocks reported by Wagster
occurred in just two of the eighteen weeks he identified --- the week containing January 5, 1987, when the
coefficient on the dummy variable was 12.67%, and the week of April 15, 1987, when the coefficient was
21.21%. The only other significant week was that of June 22, 1987, when the Japanese banks experienced
a 7.82% decrease in stock price after allowing for market and interest rate effects. That is, all the
significant “action” in bank stock prices occurred on three dates in the first half of 1987.
The reported BIS announcement effects on U.S. banks were much smaller. This outcome is per
se contrary to most studies which suggest that the BIS capital requirements were, if anything, relatively
more beneficial to U.S. banks than Japanese banks. For example, summarizing their detailed study of the
implementation of the Accord in Japan and the U.S., Scott and Iwahara (1994)  “…guess that the Accord
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has been of more benefit to U.S. than to Japanese banks because they operate in a more favorable
accounting, tax, and regulatory context” (1994, p. 3).
 We repeated regression (5) for Japanese banks over the period w ich begins with the week
ending September 20, 1985 and ends with the week ending March 30, 1990, approximately the same as






















































Wagster reports a 12.67% Basle announcement effect in the first week of 1987, which is roughly the same
as what we find --- 11.5% for all banks and 13.3% for city banks. However, our estimates of the April
announcement effect, 13.4% for all banks and 12.2% for city banks, are substantially less than his 21.2%
estimate. Likewise, we estimate the negative June announcement effect to be in the –3.4%-3.9% range,
which is about half his estimate of -7.82%. These differences are likely due to the differences in bank
coverage (the exact composition of the Japanese banks in the Wagster study was not reported), returns
measurement (we used returns for weeks ending on Friday, while Wagster’s weeks ended on Wednesday);
choice of long and short-term interest rate variables, and the like. Overall, however, our estimates of the
returns on Japanese banks are in rough agreement with Wagster’s.
However, we believe that it is unlikely that the stock price changes on Japanese banks in January,
April, and June, 1987 are, in fact, due to Basle accord announcements. On January 5, 1987 the
                                                 
44 Dummy variables for Wagster’s 15 “non-significant” announcement dates for Japanese banks have been
suppressed. The results are substantially the same when the banks are equally-weight d, i.e. the weekly
returns of most banks are roughly of the same magnitude.
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annoucement identified in Wagster (1996, Appendix I) was that “The Bank of Japan announced that
Gerald Corrigan, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, would visit Japan this Friday to
discuss regulatory cooperation. He will then proceed to the Basle C mmittee  meeting to be held next
week.” We could find no reports in the (English language) press on the week of Corrigan’s visit,
suggesting that his visit may have been of minor significance. But there was news that “City and Trust
Banks continued to score sharp gains due to expectations of record profits for most leading financial
institutions” (Financial Times, January 7). Similar stories were published before the market closed for
New Year 1987, e.g. “Analysts said banks seemed a good buy because of their long-term earnings
prospects” (Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 29, 1986).
On April 13, 1987, the Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly report d that “Britain Rethinks Its New
Power to Punish Japanese Banks for Tokyo’s Trade Sins.” The British government had previously
“…decided to…revoke licences or deny new licences for Japanese banks and insurance companies to do
business in London” (p. 11) as part of a broader trade war. Especially if the government action would
have been precedent-setting, it is easy to see that Britain’s decision to “back off” would explain the
substantial positive returns to Japanese banks in mid-April, 1987. Indeed, if the Japanese bank stock
prices were reacting to news about inclusion of  Japa ese bank services in a threatened trade war, it would
be strong evidence of the importance of international business to the Japanese banks, and thus of the
losses that would have occurred if they failed to meet the BIS capital standards.45
The big changes in Japanese bank stocks in mid-April were also quite asynchronous, again
making it less plausible that they were primarily due to announcements concerning the Basle Accord. For
example, Mitsubishi Bank’s stock rose 5.9% on Thursday April 9, 11.95% on Friday April 10, and 6.6%
on Tuesday, April 14 with only small movements on surrounding days. Likewise, Sakura Bank’s stock
rose 10.5% on Thursday April 9, 15.1% on Friday April 10, 16.6% on Tuesday, April 14, and 14% on
Wednesday, April 15. By contrast, Nippon Credit Bank’s price went up 16.8% on Tuesday, April 14,
                                                 
45 We understand that the Ministry of Finance indicated its willingness to allow banks to raise capital in a
public offering in April 1987 which could have been “good news” if banks were capital constrained.
Presumably public offerings could also be “bad news” if there were asymmetry-of-information problems,
or if the public offerings alleviated a scarcity of free-floating bank shares.
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14.08% on Friday, April 17, and 12.3% on Monday, April 20. LTCB’s went up 7.61% on Friday, April
10, 7.1% on Wednesday, April 15, 7.1% on Thursday, April 16, 8.7% on Friday, April 17, and 7.6% on
Monday, April 20. It is always difficult to know what shocks are unanticipated and thus cause price
movements in an efficient market. But this spread over time in price reaction seems more consistent with
a market resolving how different banks would be affected differently by the trade sactions applied to
financial services. Moreover, the price reactions seem to begin a couple of days before the weekend of
April 11-12, 1987, about the time that news about the British government’s actions would have begun to
reach the market.
On June 22, 1987, the Bank of Japan was reported to be “…urging commercial banks to exercise
caution in lending during the July-September quarter...” (Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 22,
1987, p. 4). It is perhaps more plausible that this announcement, if unanticipated, is behind the three to
four percent (7.8% in Wagster) drop in banks’ stock prices that week than action on the Basle accord, viz
“’The Brussels formula’ was conceived that defined banks’ capital similar to the method used in the U.S.-
U.K. agreement. For the first time, German authorities indicated that they could, in principal, support the
new plan.” (Wagster (1996), Appendix I).
In summary, we believe that it is difficult to attribute changes in Japanese bank stock prices in
the late 1980s to news about Basle Accord negotiations.  Particularly in early 1987, the price changes
seem more likely to have been associated with  r visions in forecasts of bank profits. The market may have
interpreted the news about profits as evidence that the banks were making positive NPV loans, or it may
have been “fooled” by the high margins and low provisions on the loans. The latter is perhaps less
plausible because the banks did not appear to respond in earnest to the capital regulations, by making
riskier loans, until later in the 1980s.
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7. Summary and Discussion
The evidence presented here is that Japanese banks, when faced with tight (for them) BIS capital
standards which became fully effective in March 1993, made increasingly x ante risky loans in the late
1980s and early 1990s.  By so doing, they were able to pump up retained earnings and thus their BIS
capital ratios. The retained earnings appear to have been a lower cost source of funds than external equity
issues for the banks. Cross-sectionally, the city, trust, and long-term banks with higher capital deficienci s
vis-à-vis the BIS standards increased their risky lending the most. Moreover, after the collapse in Japanese
equity prices, the banks which experienced the biggest declines in hidden reserves tended to increase their
risky lending the most. Regional II banks which were subject to the BIS guidelines behaved similarly to
the major banks; however, for the remaining non-BIS Regional II banks, there was no correlation between
their risky lending and our estimate of their BIS capital ratio.
Our results depend upon our classification of loans to real estate, construction, and finance
companies as risky. At least three arguments support this contention that the real-estate-related loans were
indeed ex ante riskier, not just ex post riskier.  First, Standard & Poor’s lowered their debt ratings for
sharply increasing numbers of Japanese banks beginning in 1990, i.e. during our sample period. As Fig. 7
shows, the debt of one bank was downgraded in 1989, while 16 debt issues were downgraded in 1990, 12
of them long-term debt issues. Since debt ratings should reflect banks’ leverage as well as the riskiness of
their loans and other assets, and leverage increased as equity prices fell beginning in the 1990s, not all of
the ratings decline can be attributed to increases in loan risk. But the calculations in Section 2 showed that
the magnitude of the change in unlevered mark-to-market value of bank assets which would have had to
occur to explain the changes in observed spreads and ratings was quite plausible.
Second, the rank correlation between growth in what we’ve defined as banks’ risky lending over
the period March 1987-March 1993 and the banks’ March 1994 disclosed non-performing loans as a
fraction of total loans is 0.24 for the city banks. This might seem low, but the same rank correlation using
UBS’s (1994) estimates of the respective banks’ non-performing loans, as opposed to the banks’ disclosed
problem loans,  is 0.58. Finally, if we apply Asai’s (1996) estimates of the amounts collectible to the UBS
non-performing loan estimates, the correlation between our ranking of banks according to their risky
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lending from 1987-1993 and their ranking in 1994 with respect to estimates of probable loan losses is
0.79.
Third, banks’decision making procedures are “visible hand” evidence of changes in loan
portfolio risk. At least some banks reportedly changed the way that they organized loan originations in the
1980s which, if anything, would have led to the banks making riskier loans. For example, pursuant to a
well-known consulting firm’s recommendations, Sumitomo Bank is reported to have switched its loan risk
evaluation responsibility from an independent credit investigation bureau to a monitoring bureau which
reported to the sales division (after 1990, it reportedly switched back to the old organizational form!).46
We examined Japanese bank stock price changes in the late 1980s which Wagster (1996)
attributed to announcements concerning the Basle Accord. We argue that there are other more plausible
explanations for the stock price changes, particularly in early 1987 when forecasts of increased bank
profits were released. The effect of news items about increased bank profits could itself indicate that the
riskier loans being made by Japanese banks were (unexpectedly) positive NPV. But generally the risk
taking didn’t begin in earnest until 1988-1989. There is evidence that spreads on OECD and Asian loans
increased substantially from 1987 through 1989-1990 while there is no hard evidence that credit risk
increased substantially in these borrower countries.  McCauley and Yeaple (1994) attribute the increased
spreads to Japanese banks’ management decisions following decreases in the value of their equity
holdings that began in 1990.
The generality of insurance subsidies and moral hazard incentives could explain why Australia
and New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Korea, and the U.S. have also recently experienced banking problems
even though their regulatory and operating environments differ from Japan’s. Moreover, the trend toward
declining demand for commercial banks’ traditional services and tighter margins seems to be world-wide.
In this environment, the BIS mininum capital standards could have acted as a catalyst for bank risk-taking
similar to that which we’ve documented in Japan.
What of the future? In January 1996, the Basle Committee reissued a Supplement to the July
1988 Basle Capital Accord, extending the Capital Accord by adding capital charges for market risk to
                                                 
46We are indebted to Takeo Hoshi for telling us about this case.
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those for credit risk. “The capital standards for market risk, as set forth in [the] Amendment, will be
implemented by the G-10 supervisory authorities by year-end 1997 at the latest” (Basle Committee
(1996b)). It will allow a Tier 3 level of capital to be used in satisfying the capital requirement for market
risk.
The definitions of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital will still be largely accounting-based, and
interdependencies between credit risk and market risk will apparently not be taken into account.
Unfortunately, capital standards that apply to market risks and traded assets are also potentially much
more vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage47  th n credit risk standards because a liquid secuities or
derivatives portfolio can be changed in a matter of minutes. For the same reason, monthly or annual
inspections and disclosure requirements will be of little use in controlling the “arbitrage” of market risk
regulations48.
                                                                                                                                      
47 For example, the Amendment assigns weights for general market risk by maturity classes or duration
classes. But these official weights almost certainly won’t match market weights --- for a start,
sophisticated fixed income models won’t have fixed weights over different interest rate environments (see
Marsh (1995) for references).
48 Which is why securities clearinghouses monitor positions intra-day for large positions and/or in volatile
market situations, and serious securities firms hedge risk more-or-less in real time. The Basle Committee
themselves make note of this problem: “Supervisory authorities have at their disposal a number of
effective measures to ensure that banks do not ‘window dress’ by showing significantly lower market risk
positions on reporting dates. Banks will also, of course, be expected to maintain strict risk management
systems to ensure that intra-day exposures are not excessive” (Basle Committee (1996a)).
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APPENDIX
RELATIVE ATTRACTIVNESS OF PROVISIONING AGAINST LOAN LOSSES,
WRITE-OFF,  AND NOT RECOGNIZING BAD LOANS FOR JAPANESE
BANKS, GIVEN TAX AND BIS CAPITAL RULES
For simplicity, we assume:
· If a loan goes bad, a 100% loss occurs
· Write-offs and general provisions (up to 0.3%) are fully tax deductible
· Loans are the only bank assets
· Specific Provisions, General Provisions, and Write-offs have the same timing
Let:
tsp = The portion of specific reserves allowed as a tax deduction
t = The Marginal Tax Rate;
L = Total Loans Outstanding
B=  Bad Loan Amount (B/L = fraction of loans which are bad)
C = BIS-defined Capital
I = Income
Not Recognized General Provision Specific Provision Write-off
Total Loan L L L L
Capital C C C C
BIS Ratio C/L C/L C/L C/L
Pre-tax Income I I I I
Bad Loan Loss B B B B
Deductible Loss 0 B tsp B B
Taxable Income I I-B I- tsp B I-B
Tax Paid t I t (I-B) t (I- tsp B) t (I-B)
After-Tax Income I(1- t) I(1- t)+ tB I(1- t)+ tsp tB I(1- t)+ tB
D BIS Capital due
to BIS Accounting
0 B 0 0
Total BIS Capital C+ I(1- t) C+B+ I(1- t)+ tB C+ I(1- t)+ tsp tB C+ I(1- t)+ tB
Total BIS Assets L L-B L-B L-B
New BIS Ratio C+ I (1- )
L
t C+B+ I (1- )+  B
L-B
t t C+ I (1- )+  B
L-B









C+ I (1- )
L
t
  (General Provision > Not Recognizing)
· 




C+ I (1-  )+  B
L-B
t t
   (Not Recognizing > Write-off, for B<<L)
· 




C+ I (1- )+  B
L-B
t t tsp  (Write-off > Specific Provisioning)
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